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Examining the performance of the supply chain for potatoes in the Red 




Using an analysis of marketing margins and the key dimensions of long-term buyer-seller 
relationships (satisfaction, trust, power-dependence and the willingness to make relationship 
specific investments), it is possible to demonstrate that the supply chain for potatoes 
cultivated in the Red River Delta (Vietnam) is surprisingly efficient. While the price paid to 
farmers is ultimately determined by supply and demand, the price farmers receive from 
traders and collector agents is influenced by tuber quality and the costs of transportation. 
Contrary to expectations, farmers are generally satisfied with the exchange and display 
considerable trust in their preferred trading partner. Farmers are seldom dependent upon their 
preferred trading partner and indicate that numerous alternative traders are available to 
purchase the potatoes they have harvested. While the traders similarly enjoy a strong positive 
relationship both with farmers and collector agents and their down-stream customers, 
wholesalers report that they are much less satisfied in their exchange relationship with both 
the traders and the retailers. Wholesalers are more dependent upon both their up-stream and 
down-stream trading partners and are more dissatisfied and less trusting of their exchange 
partners.  
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Introduction 
In the developing countries there has been much discussion about the potential exploitation of 
small farmers by various market intermediaries. In most developing countries, the agricultural 
marketing system is characterised by a highly atomistic production side and an oligopolistic 
marketing system (Mendoza and Rosegrant, 1995). Marketing costs are high because of an 
inefficient transport system, inadequate cool storage capacity and significant variations in 
product form, variety and quality (Harris-White, 1995). The supply chain itself is often long 
and protracted, involving a large number of market intermediaries (Lele, 1981). Furthermore, 
information and locational factors potentially limit the number of intermediaries available to 
transact with primary producers (Pomeroy and Trinidad, 1995). In other instances, various 
credit arrangements may lock farmers into long-term relationships where the farmer is, to 
varying degrees, more or less dependent upon the market intermediary (Mendoza and 
Rosegrant, 1995; Tagarino et al., 1998). 
Developed primarily by Williamson (1979, 1985), transaction cost theory assumes that 
various costs are associated with an exchange. These costs are comprised of the costs of 
obtaining and processing information, negotiating contracts, monitoring agents and enforcing 
contracts. These costs may become significant in the presence of information asymmetry, 
uncertainty and transaction specific investments. 
Although there are several different approaches towards measuring the level and effects of 
transaction costs, Frank and Henderson (1992) employ various measures to evaluate the costs 
of uncertainty, transaction specific investments, the costs of co-ordination and concentration. 
Market concentration is a strong indicator of non-competitive pricing behaviour and of 
inefficient market performance (Mendoza and Rosegrant, 1995). Ordinarily, the presence of a 
few large market agents within a market is sufficient evidence of market power and price 
collusion. However, in order to verify the extent to which various actors have been exploited 
by unfair trading practices, the net returns and marketing margins at each step in the supply 
chain need to be estimated (Pomeroy and Trinidad, 1995). 
Markets are said to be efficient if the price consumers ultimately pay adequately reflects 
storage costs, transportation costs and differences in price due to product form (Harris-White, 
1995). Since price data is usually the most readily available and most reliable source of 
market information in the developing countries (Goletti and Christina-Tsigas, 1995), the 
performance of the supply chain is most often evaluated using price margins. However, a 
large marketing margin may result in little or no profit for an actor and may even result in a 
trading loss, depending on the buying and selling prices and the costs of marketing (Mendoza, 
1995). Marketing margins may also fluctuate due to the perishability of the product, the 
number of actors involved in the exchange, the marketing services provided and the risk and 
uncertainty borne by each actor (Pomeroy and Trinidad, 1995).  
More important however, is the growing recognition that exchange is embedded in various 
overarching social institutions including locality, class, ethnicity, religion, gender and age 
(Zucker, 1986; Fukuyama, 1995; Harris-White, 1997). The importance of trust and social 
capital as a means of reducing risk and facilitating exchange is becoming more evident 
(Fafchamps, 1996; Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998; Lyon, 2000).  
Social capital facilitates exchange in at least two ways. Trust and the emotional attachment to 
a group, society or association can improve the efficiency of the market. Benefits may also 
arise through the formation of networks (Fafchamps and Minten, 1998). These relationships 
greatly reduce search costs and facilitate the exchange of information on market conditions 
and prices, trade flows and credit and reduce perceived risk. 
While there are obvious parallels between the concept of social capital and the emerging body 
of literature on long-term relationships in business-to-business markets, there is little evidence 
of any serious attempt to integrate these theoretical frameworks. This is unfortunate, for while 
a precise definition of social capital remains elusive, the key relationship constructs of 




Defined by Putnam (1995) as the “features of social organisation such as networks, norms and 
trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit”, social capital provides a 
valuable resource for the conduct of social exchange (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). With the 
majority of the capital embedded within networks of mutual acquaintance and recognition, 
social capital resides and is reinforced by the pattern of linkages and the relationships that are 
built within the network.  
Unlike other forms of capital, social capital increases with use (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
However, not only is social capital intangible (Murphy, 2002), no one actor has, or is capable 
of having, exclusive ownership (Burt, 1992).  Moreover, although it has value-in-use, social 
capital cannot be easily traded. Social capital facilitates cooperative behaviour and the transfer 
of information and resources (Sharp and Smith, 2003). Social capital makes it possible to 
achieve desired outcomes that would be impossible without it or could only be achieved at 
considerable cost. In a sense, social capital facilitates the governance of economic exchange 
(Annen, 2003), reducing the potential for opportunism and the need for costly monitoring 
processes (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
As Putnam (1995) has observed, social capital is not a unidimensional construct. Nor is there 
any accepted definition of social capital; different authors seem to focus on different facets of 
the construct. However, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) provide the most comprehensive 
definition to date, defining social capital as “the sum of the actual and potential resources 
embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed 
by an individual or social unit” (p 243). While differentiating between structural 
embeddedness, relational embeddedness and cognitive elements, Nahapiet and Ghoshal note 
that social capital developed in one context cannot always be readily transferred to another. 
Similarly, Putnam (1995) indicates that the measures of social capital relevant for one culture 
may be irrelevant in another. More recently, Murphy (2002) has criticised the lack of 
definitional clarity, noting that issues such as social, political and economic power are omitted 
from most discussions of social capital. Social capital remains unable to adequately explain 
the precise role an individual may play in the development process.  
However, it is generally accepted that trust and trustworthiness are central to the concept of 
social capital (Fukuyama, 1995). Trust is developed both from the generalised norms of 
morality and personalised sources embedded within the social network (Lyon, 2000). Putnam 
(1993) and Fukuyama (1995) suggest that people who know and trust one another are more 
likely to cooperate and find solutions to problems that are mutually acceptable to everyone.  
Trust is also paramount in the development of meaningful long-term business relationships 
(Dwyer et al., 1987; Han et al., 1993; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Wilson, 1995). However, 
whereas the measurement of trust remains elusive in the social capital literature, numerous 
measures have been tested and validated within the relationship literature. 
 
Trust 
Anderson and Narus (1990) view trust as the belief that an exchange partner will perform 
actions that will result in positive outcomes for the firm and will not take unexpected actions 
that may result in negative outcomes. Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman (1993) define trust 
as the willingness to rely upon an exchange partner in whom one has confidence.  
While both of these definitions view trust as a behavioural intention that reflects reliance upon 
the exchange partner, both definitions, in part, capture quite different aspects of the construct. 
Moorman et al., (1993) definition of trust as a belief, a sentiment or an expectation about an 
exchange partner, results from the partner’s expertise, reliability and intentionality. This 
component of trust, which Ganesan (1994) describes as credibility, is based on the extent to 
which the focal firm believes that its exchange partner has the necessary expertise to perform 
the activity effectively and reliably.  
However, trust also relates to the focal firm’s intention to rely on their exchange partner. 
Ganesan (1994) describes this component as benevolence, because it is based on the extent to 
which the focal firm believes that its partner has intentions and motives beneficial to it. A 
benevolent partner will subordinate immediate self-interest for the long-term benefit of both 
parties and will not take actions that may have a negative impact on the firm. Singh and 
Sirdeshmukh (2000) describe trust as a belief that an exchange partner will act in a manner 
that is responsible, with integrity and without injury to the focal firm. While this aspect of 
trust is also behavioural because it focuses on the partner’s tendency to act, there is a 
structural component that refers to the trust fostered by mutual hostages (Madhok, 1995).  
When an actor trusts its exchange partner, it feels more secure that the actions of its partner 
will result in positive outcomes (Geyskens et al., 1998). With the attainment of desired goals 
and accumulated evidence of non-reneging behaviour, satisfaction will increase (Frazier, 
1983; Dwyer et al., 1987; Anderson and Narus 1990).  
 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) arises from the focal firms feelings in response to an 
evaluation of one or more use experiences with the product (Woodruff, 1997). According to 
the disconfirmation of expectations model, customer satisfaction is the result of a comparison 
between a supplier’s performance and customer’s expectations (Oliver, 1980; Fornell, 1992). 
Whenever performance exceeds expectations, satisfaction will increase. Conversely, 
whenever performance falls below expectations, customers will become dissatisfied. 
Expectations are beliefs about the likelihood that a product is associated with certain 
attributes, benefits or outcomes (Spreng et al., 1996). However, since different customers may 
be either satisfied or dissatisfied by the same experience, customer satisfaction will be 
influenced by the pre-experience standards against which performance is ultimately 
compared.  
Fornell et al., (1996) believe that overall customer satisfaction has three antecedents; 
perceived quality, perceived value and the customer’s expectations. Perceived quality or 
performance is the customer’s evaluation of their most recent consumption experience. Such 
is derived from two primary components; products must not only perform adequately on 
various instrumental dimensions (technical quality), but customers must also be satisfied by 
the manner in which they receive those products (functional quality) (Gronroos, 1990). Swan 
and Combs (1976) argue that for customers to experience satisfaction, products must perform 
adequately on the key instrumental dimensions. If performance here is sufficiently good, then 
customers can experience satisfaction from the functional dimensions. 
Customer expectations will also relate either favourably or unfavourably to whatever prior 
consumption experience the customer has had of the firm’s offer and a forecast of the 
supplier’s ability to deliver in the future. Especially in mature, stable markets, expectations 
should accurately reflect the quality of the firm’s current product offer. Customers should 
have expectations that are largely rational and reflect their ability to learn from experience 
and accurately predict the levels of quality and value they will receive (Fornell et al., 1996). 
Since satisfaction is defined as a positive affective state resulting from an appraisal of all 
aspects of a firm’s working relationship with another (Frazier et al., 1989), Geyskens et al.,  
(1999) propose that satisfaction should capture both the economic and psychosocial aspects of 
the exchange. Economic satisfaction is derived from the channel member’s positive affective 
response to the economic rewards that flow from its relationship with its partner (Frazier, 
1983). An economically satisfied channel member considers the relationship a success when 
it is satisfied with the effectiveness and productivity of the relationship with its partner and 
the resulting financial outcomes. Social satisfaction is derived from the channel member’s 
positive affective response to the non-economic aspects of the relationship in that interactions 
with the exchange partner are fulfilling, gratifying and easy. A channel member satisfied with 
the social aspects of the exchange appreciates the contact with its exchange partner and, on a 
personal level, likes working with the partner because it believes the partner is concerned, 
respectful and willing to exchange ideas (Geyskens et al., 1999). 
Conversely, conflict has a direct negative effect on satisfaction (Frazier et al., 1989). Firms 
that are able to lower the overall level of conflict in their relationship experience greater 
satisfaction (Anderson and Narus, 1990). Conflict in channel relationships most often occurs 
over economic issues. Channel members that are satisfied with the economic rewards that 
flow from their relationship perceive their partner to be advancing their goals as opposed to 
impeding or preventing them. Satisfaction then, is determined by the congruence between the 
firm’s goals for entering into the relationship, compared with what the firm actually achieves 
(Hakansson and Sharma, 1996). 
 
Power-dependence 
When the outcomes obtained from the relationship are important or highly valued the focal 
firm is more dependent (Heide and John, 1988). Dependence is also increased when the 
outcomes from the relationship are higher than or better than the outcomes available from 
alternative relationships and when fewer alternative sources of exchange are available to the 
firm. 
Dependence refers to a firm’s need to maintain a channel relationship in order to achieve 
desired goals (Frazier et al., 1989). Resource dependence theory suggests that firms engage in 
transactions because they require resources from other firms (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978). 
When a channel member controls resources that the other channel member wants, various 
power relations emerge that enable the party controlling the resource to exert some influence 
or power (Andaleeb, 1996).  
Nevertheless, Anderson and Narus (1990) propose that it is the firm’s perception of its 
dependence relative to its partner that is of most interest in channel relationships. Relative 
dependence determines the extent to which a firm will have influence over or be influenced 
by its partner. With increasing dependence comes greater vulnerability (Krapfel et al., 1991) 
for the more powerful partner may be in a position to create more favourable terms of trade 
for itself (Heide and John, 1988; Frazier et al., 1989).   
In general, firms will seek to reduce their dependence on other firms (Heide and John, 1988) 
and to increase the dependence of other firms upon itself (Lohtia and Krapfel, 1994). Firms 
may either seek to reduce and manage dependence by purposely structuring their exchange 
relationships with other firms (Heide, 1994) or to deal with multiple entities (Ganesan, 1994). 
However, the need to interact with a specific exchange partner will depend on the number of 
alternatives available (Hakansson and Wootz, 1979; Anderson and Weitz, 1986). Where there 
are many alternatives, the need to interact is reduced, but as the number of alternative 
suppliers declines, the need to interact will increase (Andaleeb, 1996). 
 
Relationship specific investments 
In industrial markets, the role of interpersonal contacts and social networks is a crucial 
element in exchange transactions (Cunningham and Turnbull, 1982). Every person has some 
traits that may potentially interest an exchange partner and which will affect perceptions of 
value in the exchange. The cost of establishing this perception can be regarded as an 
investment that will facilitate exchange in the future (Easton and Araujo, 1994).  
Investments are a process through which resources are committed in order to create, build or 
acquire other resources to be used in the future (Easton and Araujo, 1994). As such, buyer-
seller relationships can be regarded as an investment. Through interacting with other firms 
and committing resources to specific relationships, firms have the opportunity to use 
relationships as a resource for the creation of other resources, product adaptations and 
innovations, process improvements, or to provide access to third parties (Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1995). Relationships produce something that neither firm can produce in isolation 
and something that cannot be easily duplicated. Relationships have important effects on the 
development of technical competence and the capabilities of a firm. They affect the firm’s 
productivity, innovativeness and competence and thus its performance potential.  
However, relationships are mutually demanding as well as being mutually rewarding 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). If a company wishes to improve its relationship with a 
partner (or partners) to achieve future benefit(s), then in all probability, the firm will need to 
commit various resources to the relationship, whether expressed in terms of managerial or 
sales force time, product or service development, process, financial or administrative 
adaptations (Ford et al., 1996).  
Since most relationships are based on some kind of match between the operations of two 
firms, one or both firms may find it necessary to adapt to the needs and capabilities of the 
other (Hallen et al., 1991). Adaptations can be seen most clearly by such things as a supplier’s 
modification of a product to suit a customer, delivering to meet buyer’s production schedules 
rather than the supplier’s, or the joint establishment of a stock-holding facility (Ford, 1984). 
The supplier may also modify production processes, use alternative logistics systems such as 
just-in-time and adopt various systems, including quality management, to meet the demands 
of a customer (Ganesan, 1994).  
Such investments may be described as being relationship specific, for they are, by their very 
nature, customer specific and are therefore vulnerable to potential loss should the relationship 
be terminated. Williamson (1985) suggests that making idiosyncratic (or relationship specific) 
investments helps to stabilise relationships by altering the firm’s incentive structure. By 
investing in the relationship, a channel member creates an incentive to maintain the 
relationship, for engaging in opportunistic behaviour and risking the dissolution of the 
relationship may be contrary to their long-term self interest (Anderson and Weitz, 1992).  
 
Data collection and analysis 
To gain a greater understanding of the efficiency of the supply chain for fresh potatoes in the 
Red River Delta (RRD), a pluralistic approach was adopted. 
Beginning initially with an examination of the transaction costs, market intermediaries were 
asked what quantity of potatoes they purchased during which months, from who they 
purchased those potatoes and how much they paid to purchase those potatoes. Respondents 
were then asked a series of questions about the various value-adding activities they undertook 
including grading, packing and storage and the various costs incurred to undertake those 
activities. Finally, respondents were asked to indicate the prices at which those potatoes were 
sold to down-stream customers.   
Recognising that exchange in business-to-business markets generally occurs within the 
context of rich and stable relationships (Easton and Araujo, 1994), respondents were asked to 
indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with 28 prepared statements describing 
the nature of their relationship with their preferred up-stream supplier and their preferred 
down-stream customer.  
Satisfaction was evaluated by seven measures adapted from Anderson and Narus (1990), 
Anderson and Weitz (1992), Ford (1984), Frazier (1983) and Ganesan (1994). Although 
satisfaction is most often measured using a rating scale anchored at one end by satisfaction 
and at the other by dissatisfaction (Dorsch et al., 1998; Frazier et al., 1989; Ganesan, 1994), 
there is growing concern that the existing measures of customer satisfaction are too simplistic 
and mechanistic (Tikkanen and Alajoutsijarvi 2002). Geyskens et al., (1999) argue that 
satisfaction is comprised not of one but two quite distinct dimensions: economic satisfaction 
and social satisfaction. Tikkanen and Alajoutsijarvi (2002) describe the need for measures of 
satisfaction to capture various elements of adaptations, cooperation and conflict resolution.  
Trust was assessed by eight measures based on the literature reported by Anderson and Narus 
(1990), Anderson and Weitz (1992), Doney and Cannon (1997), Ganesan (1994), Kumar 
(1996), Moorman et al., (1993) and Morgan and Hunt (1994). Given that close personal 
friendships are of great importance in facilitating trust in the developing countries 
(Fafchamps, 1996; Lyon, 2000), an additional measure was included to capture this 
dimension.   
Power-dependence was evaluated by five measures developed from the literature reported by 
Frazier et al., (1989), Ganesan (1994), Heide and John (1988) and Heide (1994). A single 
measure was used to capture the construct (CLalt) described by Anderson and Narus (1990) as 
“the outcomes given comparison level for alternatives” (p 43), which represents the overall 
quality of the outcomes available from the best alternative exchange relationship. Although 
not derived directly from the power-dependence literature, an additional measure was 
included to evaluate the extent to which the preferred exchange partner sometimes acted 
opportunistically (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Gundlach et al.,1995). 
Relationship specific investments were evaluated by six measures developed from the 
literature reported by Anderson and Narus (1990), Anderson and Weitz (1992), Athaide et al. 
(1996) and Ford (1984) 
Detailed interviews were conducted with 60 potato farmers. Twenty farmers were interviewed 
from each of the three major potato producing provinces in the RRD (Hai Duong, Thai Binh 
and Bac Giang). Enumerators interviewed 4 farmers from a minimum of 5 districts, 
interviewing no more than two farmers from any one village. Interviews were conducted by 
research staff from the Food Crops Research Institute, Gia Loc. 
At the conclusion of the interview, farmers were asked to identify the trader with whom they 
most frequently interacted. Based on the number of names received, ten traders in each 
province were selected for interview.  
In turn, at the conclusion of the interview, traders were asked to identify the potato wholesaler 
with whom they most frequently interacted. From the names received, ten wholesalers were 
selected for interview in Hanoi.  
Finally, a total of 10 interviews with retailers were undertaken in Hanoi, with 5 additional 
interviews being undertaken with retailers in each of the three provincial centres.  
 
Examining the price margins in the supply chain 
Since few farmers and market intermediaries maintain any written records of the prices at 
which they buy and sell potatoes, some errors in reporting are inevitable. Furthermore, since 
there is a degree of commercial confidentiality associated with the reporting of market prices, 
respondents may deliberately choose to over value the prices at which they have purchased 
potatoes and to under value the prices at which they have been sold to reduce their perceived 
profit margin.  
Farmers in Hai Duong indicated that they sold potatoes to traders for an average price of 
VND1,385 per kg (USD0.092 per kg). Traders indicated that they purchased potatoes from 
farmers for an average price of VND1,470 per kg and sold those potatoes to both wholesalers 
in Hanoi and retailers in Hai Duong for an average price of VND1,770 per kg. In Hai Duong, 
retailers indicated that they purchased potatoes from traders for VND1,795 per kg and then 
sold those potatoes for an average price of VND2,150 per kg. However, in Hanoi, wholesalers 
sold these potatoes for an average price of VND2,180 per kg to retailers who sold the potatoes 
for an average retail price of VND2,920 per kg (Table 1). 
  
Table 1.  Buying and selling prices along the supply chain (VND per kg). 
 
 Farmer Trader Wholesaler Retailer 
Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell 
Hai Duong 1,385 1,470 1,770   1,795 2,150 
Thai Binh 1,420 1,280 1,450   1,465 1,950 
Bac Giang 1,170 1,370 1,680   1,535 1,920 
        
Hanoi    1,785 2,180 2,305 2,920 
 
 
In Bac Giang, there was a difference of VND200 between the reported price at which farmers 
sold potatoes and traders purchased potatoes. No doubt this was the result of intervention in 
the market by collector agents. Collector agents were responsible for sourcing the potatoes 
from many small farmers and arranging for the transportation of those potatoes to some 
central collection point. Farmers were paid in cash for their potatoes when the collector agent 
took possession of the product. The potatoes were then graded and stored for between 5-7 
days until the trader came to pick them up. Depending upon the level of services provided by 
the collector agent, traders appear willing to pay an additional VND50-200 per kg. While 
there was a difference of VND145 per kg between the price at which traders indicated they 
sold the potatoes and retailers purchased the potatoes, this was attributed to sampling error, 
for the retail margin of VND385 per kg was consistent with the other estimates. 
In Thai Binh, it is apparent that farmers grossly over reported the prices at which they sold 
potatoes, for both the trader’s margin and the retail margin were consistent with the other two 
potato growing districts. This was supported by anecdotal evidence and various unstructured 
interviews with farmers undertaken during the preliminary phase of this research project. 
Furthermore, and similar to Bac Giang, the majority of potato farmers transact not with the 
traders, but with collector agents. 
An examination of the marketing margins along the supply chain reveals that the marketing 
margin increases as the product moves closer to the consumer. Traders were able to extract an 
average marketing margin of VND260 per kg (or 19%). In the rural areas, retailers extracted 
an average marketing margin of VND410 per kg (or 25%). However, in Hanoi, wholesalers 
were able to extract a marketing margin in the region of VND395 per kg (or 22%), and the 
retailers were able to extract a marketing margin of VND615 per kg (or 27%). 
However, the marketing margin market intermediaries were able to extract was not consistent 
over the season. At both the beginning (December) and the end (February) of the harvest 
season, the marketing margins declined. Conversely, in January, during the peak harvest 
period, the marketing margins for all market intermediaries increased. Such pricing behaviour 
has been reported by Batt and Parining (2000) who accredited the reduced marketing margin 
during times of reduced supply to the increased competition between traders to secure the 
farmers produce. At the consumer level, research undertaken by Batt (2002) reveals that the 
consumers in the rural areas seldom purchase potatoes for more than VND2,200 per kg and in 
Hanoi, consumers are unlikely to purchase potatoes at prices exceeding VND3,500 per kg.    
While traders may be able to extract an average marketing margin of VND260 per kg, the 
traders must not only grade and store the tubers they have purchased, but also pay for the 
costs of transporting the tubers from the farm to the various wholesale and retail markets. 
Even although most of the potatoes purchased by traders had been graded by farmers or 
collector agents (59%), a significant proportion were purchased ungraded. Furthermore, over 
half (54%) of traders indicated that they regraded the potatoes they had purchased prior to 
resale. Although the costs of grading ranged from VND10-50 per kg, the market was willing 
to pay a significant price premium for larger tubers.  
At the farm level, farmers received an average price of VND1,385 for the large tubers (5-8 
tubers per kg)(Table 2).  
 










Extra large + 185 + 170 + 240 + 450 
Large  1,385 1,595 2,180 2,550 
Medium - 180 -170 -480 -885 
 
 
For the extra large tubers (3-4 per kg), farmers received a price premium of VND185 per kg 
and for the medium sized tubers (9-15 per kg) the price was reduced by some VND180 per 
kg. For the small tubers (more than 16 tubers per kg), farmers received only VND500 per kg 
hence most farmers retained the small tubers for feeding livestock.  
As the product moved through the supply chain, not only did the price premium increase for 
the larger tubers, but the disincentive for smaller tubers became more pronounced.  
Despite the differences in price, the majority of wholesalers (74%) and retailers (70%) 
reported that they did not regrade the potatoes they had purchased prior to resale. Presumably, 
having purchased the tubers from traders and collector agents, wholesalers and retailers had 
no recourse; what they could not sell, they would either have to eat themselves or incur the 
loss. No doubt, in the absence of any formal quality standards, wholesalers and retailers 
sought to reduce the perceived risk by transacting with reputable traders and collectors agents. 
However, the ability of the market intermediaries to meet these expectations depended upon 
the quality of the potatoes they were able to source from the farmers.     
While the majority of traders (70%) stored potatoes for 5-7 days, no doubt as an integral part 
of the process of consolidation, the majority of wholesalers (63%) indicated that they did not 
store potatoes. Conversely, some 57% of retailers indicated that they stored potatoes for up to 
one month. Presumably such storage practices were undertaken to accommodate the abrupt 
reduction in the supply of potatoes in February-March. Storage losses generally ranged from 
1-5% and quite surprisingly, were not related to the storage duration. This would suggest that 
the storage losses incurred were the result or either damaged or diseased tubers being placed 
in storage, rather than tubers becoming contaminated during the storage period. 
Transportation costs consumed a significant proportion of the traders marketing margin. Of 
the three areas studied, Hai Duong was the closest to Hanoi, hence traders were able to pay a 
significantly higher price and to transact directly with the farmers. Since both Bac Giang and 
Thai Binh were located at a greater distance, farmers were paid lower prices to accommodate 
the higher transportation costs. While it is unclear whether prices in Hanoi are set at the 
wholesale level or the retail level, traders apparently work backwards, subtracting the costs of 
transport and the profit margin they seek to achieve, to arrive at a price they are prepared to 
pay the farmers and collector agents.  
On the other hand, since most wholesalers neither regrade nor store the potatoes they have 
purchased, a much greater proportion of the marketing margin will be profit. However, given 
the significant price disincentive for small tubers, should wholesalers inadvertently purchase a 
large quantity of small to medium sized tubers, they may be exposed to a potential trading 
loss.  
Being the last market intermediary in the supply chain, the retailer has no recourse. Having 
purchased the potatoes, they must either sell them, loose them to infection by disease, or 
consume them themselves.  
 
Down-stream relationships in the potato supply chain 
Contrary to expectations, it is immediately apparent that most farmers had a very positive 
relationship with their preferred trading partner (Table 3).  
The majority of farmers were very satisfied with their preferred trading partner and most 
farmers trusted their preferred trading partner. Farmers reported that their preferred trading 
partner was always honest and kept their promises. Since their preferred trading partner 
seldom acted opportunistically, farmers had confidence in their preferred trading partner and 
generally believed the information provided. With most farmers perceiving that they had been 
adequately rewarded and treated fairly and equitably, there was minimal conflict in the 
relationship. Furthermore, most farmers maintained that they had a close personal friendship 
with their preferred trading partner.  
It is also apparent that most farmers were free to act independently of their preferred trading 
partner, despite the willingness of the trader to provide financial assistance and to share the 
risks. Most farmers indicated that they could readily choose an alternative trading partner, 
although most wished to maintain their relationship with their preferred trading partner 
because they made the best offer relative to the alternatives. Furthermore, most farmers 
indicated that their preferred trading partner seldom had all the power in the relationship, nor 
did they control all the information. Preferred traders were more willing to provide both 
technical advice and market information and seldom coerced the farmer into making decisions 
that were not in their best interest.       
 
Table 3. Examining down-stream relationships between market intermediaries 
 
 F > T T > W W > R 
Satisfaction 
Trading with preferred partner is less risky  5.82 5.83 4.20 
Good cooperation with preferred trading partner 5.64 5.70 3.70 
Preferred trading partner meets expectations 5.55 5.43 3.10 
Treats me fairly and equitably 5.49 5.77 4.10
Adequately rewarded 5.44 5.57 4.30 
Quick to handle complaints  5.22 4.10 3.10 
Much conflict with preferred trading partner 2.09 2.47 2.90 
Trust 
Confidence in preferred trading partner 5.58 5.03 3.90 
Always keeps promises 5.54 5.20 4.00 
Always honest 5.53 5.37 4.00 
Good reputation  5.46 5.33 2.70 
Trust preferred trading partner 5.36 4.93 4.30 
Believe information provided 5.05 4.53 3.70 
Close personal friendship 5.03 4.77 3.80 
Trading partner always considers best interests 3.81 3.10 3.30 
Power-dependence  
Free to choose another trading partner at any time 5.71 4.90 2.90 
Has best offer relative to alternatives (CLalt) 5.31 4.57 4.30 
Must adhere to partners demands  2.78 2.37 3.78 
Trading partner has all the power 2.28 2.83 4.30 
Trading partners controls all the information 2.21 2.40 3.00 
Trading partner often acts opportunistically 2.15 2.03 3.22 
More dependent on trading partner 2.07 2.37 4.50
Relationship specific investments 
Partner asks how they can improve quality of service 5.03 4.37 3.80 
Trading partner advises on technical matters 4.98 3.72 3.60 
Partner provides financial assistance 4.98 3.43 2.70 
Trading partner advises on market prices 4.93 3.97 4.20 
Willing to share risks 4.86 3.87 2.40 
Trading partner advises of supply problems 4.86 4.23 3.50
  
      where 1 is “I disagree a lot” and 6 is “I agree a lot” 
                 F > T demonstrates the farmers’ relationship with their preferred trader 
                 T > W demonstrates the traders’ relationship with their preferred wholesaler 
                 W > R demonstrates the wholesalers’ relationship with their preferred retailer 
 
Similarly, the traders relationship with their preferred wholesale trading partner was also quite 
positive, with most traders indicating high levels of trust and satisfaction in the exchange. 
However, it was apparent that the traders were more dependent upon their preferred wholesale 
trading partner. Traders had fewer alternative exchange partners and there was more evidence 
of conflict in the relationship. Traders perceived that their wholesale trading partners had 
more power, controlled more of the information and generally took longer to respond to the 
their complaints. Furthermore, wholesalers were much less willing to provide financial 
assistance, to share the risks or to share technical information and price information with the 
trader. Surprisingly, however, most traders reported that they felt they had been adequately 
rewarded, treated fairly and equitably and there was some evidence of good cooperation 
between the traders and their preferred wholesale customers.  However, traders believed that 
their preferred wholesale trading partner did not always transact with their best interests at 
heart.   
Unlike both the farmers and the traders, the majority of wholesalers indicated much lower 
levels of both satisfaction and trust in their relationship with retail customers. Transactions 
entailed a high degree of risk and there was a greater possibility of being exposed to 
opportunistic behaviour. As a direct consequence, wholesalers reported that the majority of 
their retail customers had a very poor reputation. However, most wholesalers reported that 
they had few alternative customers. Not only were the wholesalers more dependent on their 
existing customers but retailers wielded more power and controlled more of the information. 
Although there was considerable discussion on prices, there was more evidence of conflict in 
the relationship, with retailers taking more time to respond to the wholesaler’s complaints and 
engaging in a less cooperative exchange relationship. Retailers were most unlikely to provide 
any financial assistance or to share the risks inherent in the exchange transaction. It was also 
apparent that the wholesaler’s relationship with their preferred retail customers was the least 
personal experienced in the down-stream supply chain. 
 
Up-stream relationships in the potato supply chain 
In reviewing their relationship with farmers and collector agents, the majority of traders also 
indicated that they experienced high levels of satisfaction and trust (Table 4).  
Understandably, because the collector agents accumulated potatoes from many small farmers, 
traders felt they could rely more upon the collector agents than they could upon individual 
farmers. Collector agents were more likely to keep their promises and were less likely to 
engage in opportunistic trading behaviour. Collector agents were more responsive to the 
traders complaints, more willing to investigate various means of improving the level of 
service offered to traders and more likely to provide both financial assistance and to share the 
risks. To some extent, the collector agents had to be more responsive to the trader’s demands, 
for traders indicated that they could readily find alternative suppliers. Not only could the 
traders choose to purchase potatoes directly from the farmer but they were continually 
searching for suppliers who could provide a better offer.  
  
Table 4. Examining up-stream relationships between market intermediaries 
 
 T > F T > C W > T R > W 
Satisfaction 
Trading with preferred partner is less risky  5.83 5.55 3.90 5.40 
Good cooperation with preferred trading partner 5.70 5.68 4.10 5.45 
Preferred trading partner meets expectations 5.48 5.32 4.60 5.60 
Treats me fairly and equitably 5.48 5.68 3.50 5.50 
Adequately rewarded 5.41 5.41 4.70 5.10 
Quick to handle complaints  4.26 4.77 2.70 4.90 
Much conflict with preferred trading partner 2.17 2.27 2.60 2.05 
Trust 
Trust preferred trading partner 5.35 5.00 4.40 5.16 
Always honest 5.17 5.29 4.00 4.90 
Good reputation  4.95 4.68 4.00 4.60
Always keeps promises 4.91 5.23 4.10 5.35 
Confidence in preferred trading partner 4.87 5.27 4.20 5.10 
Close personal friendship 4.68 4.73 4.20 4.85 
Believe information provided 4.10 4.23 4.10 4.95 
Trading partner always considers best interests 3.04 3.18 3.50 2.70 
Power-dependence 
Free to choose another trading partner at any time 4.77 5.10 4.40 5.80 
Has best offer relative to alternatives (CLalt) 4.05 4.14 4.60 5.25 
Trading partner has all the power 2.91 2.59 3.30 3.70 
Trading partners controls all the information 2.82 2.27 2.80 1.90 
Must adhere to partners demands  2.77 2.32 2.60 2.30 
More dependent on trading partner 2.36 2.23 2.70 2.45 
Trading partner often acts opportunistically 2.36 2.00 2.33 2.20 
Relationship specific investments 
Willing to share risks 3.32 3.82 3.20 3.90 
Partners asks how they can improve level of service 3.18 4.50 3.40 5.50 
Partner provides financial assistance 2.91 3.18 3.40 3.70 
Partner advises of supply problems 2.91 3.09 3.70 4.80 
Partner advises on technical matters 2.76 3.50 3.50 5.15 
Partner keeps me informed on market prices  2.50 3.95 4.00 5.30 
  
    where  1 is “I disagree a lot” and 6 is “I agree a lot”  
                T > F demonstrates the traders’ relationship with their preferred farmer 
                T > C demonstrates the traders” relationship with their preferred collector agent 
                W > T demonstrates the wholesalers’ relationship with their preferred trader 
                 R > W demonstrates the retailers’ relationship with their preferred wholesaler 
 
 
Since the farmers could choose to whom they sold their potatoes, farmers generally exercised 
more power and controlled more information and, to a limited extent, traders had to accept 
whatever offer the farmers chose to make, even although it was most often significantly 
below that which they ideally sought. As most farmers perceived that they had been 
adequately rewarded and treated fairly and equitably, there was little evidence of any conflict 
in the relationship. Although farmers were not expected to provide a great deal of information 
on market prices, traders reported that collector agents often shared price information with 
them. This is to be expected, for as the collector agents sought to purchase potatoes from the 
farmers, they would need to make an offer that was at least as good as that they could obtain 
from an alternative buyer. Since the collector agents had already paid the farmers to procure 
their crop, considerably more discussion on prices was anticipated, given that the prices in the 
market were extremely volatile.   
Just as the wholesalers reported that their relationship with their down-stream trading partners 
was not entirely satisfactory, wholesalers indicated that they were equally dissatisfied in their 
relationship with the traders and collector agents. Wholesalers reported that traders seldom 
treated them fairly and equitably and on most occasions, failed to meet their expectations. 
Despite the longevity of the relationship (an average of 6 years), a high degree of risk 
remained in the exchange. In the pursuit of high prices, traders often acted opportunistically 
and could not be relied upon. As the quality was highly variable, traders were slow to respond 
to the wholesaler’s complaints and seldom made any real effort to improve the level of 
service they provided. As a result, wholesalers reported only moderate levels of cooperation. 
Consequently, wholesalers had little trust and little confidence in their suppliers and there was 
more evidence of conflict in the relationship 
With most wholesalers reporting that their down-stream relationships with retail customers 
were relatively impersonal, it was no surprise to find that most reported that their up-stream 
relationships with suppliers were just as impersonal. While Zucker (1986) describes how trust 
rests on social similarities because both parties belong to the same community or social group 
and may share a common religion, ethnic status, or family background, Fafchamps (1996) 
warns that non-business relationships (with relatives, neighbours, church mates) play little 
role in identifying trustworthy clients, and goes as far to suggest that, “selling on credit to 
relatives and neighbours is as good as signing a death warrant for the firm” (p 441). Personal 
relationships often get in the way of pressuring customers for non-payment.  
Despite their dissatisfaction with the quality of the potatoes offered for sale and the price 
collector agents and traders expected for their potatoes, wholesalers had few alternative 
suppliers. With less choice, wholesalers indicated that they were, to a greater extent than the 
other market intermediaries, more dependent upon their suppliers. Traders and collector 
agents had more power, controlled more of the information and wholesalers had to be more 
willing to accept whatever potatoes trader’s were able to deliver. Furthermore, although there 
was some evidence of price negotiation, traders were reluctant to provide any financial 
support, to share the risk or to provide any technical or market information. 
While the wholesalers were generally dissatisfied in their relationship with their customers, 
retailers expressed quite high levels of satisfaction and trust in their relationship with the 
wholesalers. No doubt, a great deal of the satisfaction and trust retailers experienced in 
transacting with their preferred wholesale supplier could be attributed to higher level of 
responsiveness and the investment most wholesalers were prepared to undertake to maintain 
their relationship. Not only were most wholesalers quick the handle the retailer’s complaints, 
but they were also more willing to improve the level of service they provided to retail 
customers, more willing to provide market and technical information and in some instances, 
more willing to provide finance assistance. While most retailers indicated that they were free 
to choose an alternative supplier, most retailers indicated that their current wholesale supplier 
provided the best offer relative to the alternatives. As a consequence, retailers maintained 
their relationship with their preferred wholesale supplier because they wanted to, not because 
they had to. Nevertheless, several retailers believed that their preferred wholesale supplier did 
not always act in their best interests. 
 
Conclusions 
Uncertainty is the key dimension affecting organisations, inter-organisational relationships 
and the costs of transacting (Achrol et al., 1983; Heide, 1994). Uncertainty prompts firms to 
establish and manage relationships in order to achieve stability, predicability and 
dependability in their relationships with others (Oliver, 1990).  
With the majority of the potatoes harvested in the RRD being derived from some 235,000 
small farmers (Batt, 2002), there is considerable uncertainty in both the quantity and quality 
of tubers available. In the absence of any definitive quality standards and in order to secure a 
more reliable supply of potatoes, each of the market intermediaries agreed that transacting 
with their preferred trading partner was significantly less risky.  
However, in a market where more than 85% of the crop is harvested in just one month, the 
market will demonstrate considerable price volatility. While a long-term relationship may 
reduce some of the uncertainty associated with procuring a more reliable supply of good 
quality potatoes, the relationship is unable to provide any price certainty. As a result, each of 
the actors in the supply chain may abandon their relationship from time to time to secure a 
better price. 
While market intermediaries may find that they have occasionally paid too much to purchase 
potatoes, they are in a position to respond to the market and to modify their buying and selling 
practices in order to reduce the extent of the loss. However, for the farmers, since the potatoes 
are often dug immature and have only a limited shelf life, farmers must accept the prevailing 
market price at the time of harvest. While farmers will ordinarily transact with those traders 
who offer the best price, since the average farmer has less than 1.5 tonnes of potatoes at his 
disposal (Batt, 2002), there is some doubt as to what benefit the farmer will derive from 
selling to an alternative trader, especially if this involves extending credit. Unlike most of the 
potato farmers in Indonesia (Aji, 2001) and the Philippines (Tagarino et al., 1998), most 
Vietnamese potato farmers are not constrained by any pre-existing credit arrangements that 
might limit their ability to choose an alternative trading partner. Farmers will choose to stay 
with their preferred trading partner because they want to, not because they have to. 
Furthermore, even although it may be more profitable to delay harvest, farmers seldom have 
the choice, for they must harvest in order to adequately prepare the field for the spring rice 
crop. The farmers need for cash during the Lunar New Year festival (which generally occurs 
in January) is also believed to be one of the factors encouraging the premature harvest of 
potatoes in the RRD (Batt, 2002).  
Within the supply chain itself, it is apparent that the market intermediaries have adopted a 
cost plus pricing approach. To the purchase price, the market intermediaries add the various 
costs of grading, storage and transportation, plus their desired profit margin. In a market 
where there are many small traders, wholesalers and retailers, few switching barriers and few 
barriers to entry and exit (with the possible exception of the wholesalers), competitive market 
forces will prevent the market intermediaries at any one level in the supply chain from being 
able to extract an extraordinary price margin. Both Fafchamps (1996) and Lyon (2000) make 
similar conclusions from their respective analysis of the fresh vegetable industries in Ghana.  
 Nevertheless, it is at the wholesale level where most of the dissatisfaction arises in the supply 
chain and no doubt, it is at this level where there are the greatest barriers to entry. Perhaps, 
much of the wholesaler’s relational dissatisfaction is derived from their inability to exercise 
greater market power and to extract a greater economic rent. However, despite being the most 
concentrated sector, wholesalers exercise minimal control over the traders that supply them. 
Unless the wholesalers have made some pre-existing arrangement to purchase all the potatoes 
from a particular trader, the trader will park their truck in a designated area in the wholesale 
market and sell potatoes to whoever wants to buy them, providing they buy no less than one 
sack (Batt, 2002). While larger retailers can also buy directly from the truck, many of these 
might be better described as secondary wholesalers, for they will distribute the potatoes to 
various retail markets throughout the metropolitan area. That then leaves the wholesalers very 
much dependent upon their local customer base, who it seems may use that knowledge to 
their advantage.  
In conclusion, it is apparent that the prices farmers in the RRD receive for the potatoes they 
have grown is determined more by supply and demand then it is by the exercise of any 




Achrol, R. S., Reve, T. and Stern, L.W. (1983), “The environment of marketing dyads: a 
framework for comparative analysis”, Journal of Marketing, Vol 47 Fall, pp. 55-67. 
 
Aji, J. M.M. (2001), The extent to which buyer-seller relationships influence farmers decision 
to purchase seed potatoes in East Java- Indonesia, Unpublished Master of Rural Management 
thesis, Curtin University.  
 
Andaleeb, S.S. (1996), “An experimental investigation of satisfaction and commitment in 
marketing channels: the role of trust and dependence”, Journal of Retailing, Vol. 72 No. 1, 
pp. 77-93. 
 
Anderson, E. and Weitz, B. A. (1986),  “Make-or-buy decisions: vertical integration and 
marketing productivity”, Sloan Management Review, Spring, pp. 3-19. 
 
Anderson, E. and Weitz, B.A. (1992), “The use of pledges to build and sustain commitment in 
distribution channels”, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol 29, pp. 18-34. 
 
Anderson, J. C. and Narus, J. A. (1990), “A model of distributor firm and manufacturing firm 
working relationships”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 54 No. 1, pp. 42-58. 
 
Annen, K. (2003), “Social capital, inclusive networks and economic performance”, Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organisation, Vol. 50 No. 4, pp. 449-463. 
 
Athaide, G. A., Meyers, P.W. and Wilemon, D.L. (1996), “Seller-buyer interactions during 
the commercialisation of technological process innovations”, Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, Vol 13, pp. 406-421. 
 
Batt, P.J. and Parining, N. (2000), “Price-quality relationships in the fresh produce industry in 
Bali”, International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 177-187. 
 
Batt, P.J. (2002), Report for Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) on 
the market for seed potatoes, fresh potatoes and processed potato products in Vietnam. GTZ, 
Hanoi.  
 
Burt, R.S. (1992), Structural holes: the social structure of competition, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA. 
 
Cunningham, M.T. and Turnbull, P.W. (1982), “Inter-organisational personal contact 
patterns”, in Hakansson, H. (ed), International Marketing and Purchasing of Industrial 
Goods. An Interaction Approach, IMP Project Group, Wiley, pp. 304-315.  
 
Doney, P.M. and Cannon, J.P. (1997), “An examination of the nature of trust in buyer-seller 
relationships”, Journal of Marketing, Vol 61 April, pp. 35-51. 
 
Dorsch, M.J., Swanson, S.R. and Kelly, S.W. (1998), “The role of relationship quality in the 
stratification of vendors as perceived by customers”, Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, Vol 26 No. 2, pp. 128-142. 
 
Dwyer, F.R., Schurr, P.H. and Oh, S. (1987), “Developing buyer-seller relationships”, 
Journal of Marketing, Vol. 51 April, pp. 11-27. 
 
Easton, G. and Araujo, L. (1994), “Market exchange, social structures and time”, European 
Journal of Marketing, Vol 28 No. 3, pp. 72-84. 
 
Fafchamps, M. (1996), “The enforcement of commercial contracts in Ghana”, World 
Development, Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 427-448. 
 
Fafchamps, M. and Minten, B. (1998), Relationships and Trade in Madagascar, MSSD 
Discussion Paper No. 24, International Food Policy Research Institute. 
 
Ford, D. (1984), “Buyer/seller relationships in international industrial markets”, Industrial 
Marketing Management, Vol 13, pp. 101-112. 
   
Ford, D., McDowell, R. and Tomkins, C. (1996), “Relationship strategy, investments and 
decision making”, in Iacobucci, D. (ed), Networks in Marketing, Sage Publications, pp. 144-
176. 
 
Fornell, C. (1992), “A national customer satisfaction barometer: the Swedish experience”, 
Journal of Marketing. Vol. 55 January, pp. 1-21. 
 
Fornell, C., Johnston, M.D. Anderson, E.W. Cha, J. and Bryant, B.E. (1996). “The American 
customer satisfaction index: nature, purpose and findings”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 60  
October, pp. 7-18. 
 
Frank, S.D. and Henderson, D.R. (1992), “Transaction costs as determinants of vertical 
coordination in the US food industries”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics,  
Vol. 74 No. 4, pp. 941-50.  
 
Frazier, G.L. (1983), “Interorganisational exchange behaviour in marketing channels: a 
broadened perspective”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 47 Fall, pp. 68-78. 
 
Frazier, G.L. Gill, J.D. and Kale, S.H. (1989), “Dealer dependence levels and reciprocal 
actions in a channel of distribution in a developing country”, Journal of Marketing. Vol. 53 
January, pp. 50-69. 
 
Fukuyama, F. (1995), Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, Hamish 
Hamilton. London.  
 
Ganesan, S. (1994), “Determinants of long-term orientation in buyer-seller relationships”, 
Journal of Marketing, Vol. 58 April, pp. 1-19. 
 
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.B. and Kumar, N. (1998), “Generalisations about trust in 
marketing channel relationships using meta-analysis”, International Journal of Research in 
Marketing, Vol 15 No. 3, pp. 223-248. 
 
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.B. and Kumar, N. (1999), “A meta-analysis of satisfaction in 
marketing channel relationships”, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 36 May, pp. 223-238. 
 
Goletti, F. and Christina-Tsigas, E. (1995), “Analysing market integration”, in Scott, G. J. 
(ed) Prices, Products and People. Analysing Agricultural Markets in Developing Countries, 
Lynne Rienner, Boulder, pp. 325-342. 
 
Gronroos, C. (1990), Service management and marketing: managing moments of truth in 
service competition, Lexington Books. MA.  
 
Gundlach, G.T., Achrol, R.S. and Mentzer, J.T. (1995), “The structure of commitment in 
exchange”, Journal of Marketing, Vol 59 January, pp. 78-92. 
 
Hakansson, H. and Wootz, B. (1979), “A framework of industrial buying and selling”, 
Industrial Marketing Management, Vol. 8, pp. 28-39. 
 
Hakansson, H. and Snehota, I. (1995), Developing Relationships in Business Networks, 
International Thomson Business Press, London.  
 
Hakansson, H and Sharma, D.D. (1996), “Strategic alliances in a network perspective”, in 
Iacobucci, D. (ed),  Networks in Marketing, Sage Publications, pp. 108-124. 
 
Hallen, L., Johanson, J. and Seyed-Mohamed, N. (1991), “Interfirm adaptation in business 
relationships”, Journal of Marketing. Vol 55 April, pp. 29-37. 
 
Han, S.L. Wilson , D.T. and Dant, S.P. (1993), “Buyer-supplier relationships today”, 
Industrial Marketing Management. Vol. 22, pp. 331-338. 
 
Harris-White, B. (1995), “Efficiency and complexity: distributive margins and the profits of 
market enterprise”, in Scott, G. J. (ed), Prices, Products and People. Analysing Agricultural 
Markets in Developing Countries, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, pp. 301-324 
 
Harris-White, B. (1997), “Staple food market efficiency in developing countries: 
Introduction”, Journal of International Development, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 97-100. 
 
Heide, J.B. and John, G. (1988), “The role of dependence balancing in safe-guarding 
transaction-specific assets in conventional channels”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 52 January, 
pp. 20-35. 
 
Heide, J.B. (1994), “Interorganisational governance in marketing channels”, Journal of 
Marketing, Vol. 58 January, pp. 71-85. 
 
Humphrey, J. and Schmitz, H. (1998), “Trust and interfirm relations in developing and 
transition economies”, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 34 No. 4, pp. 32-49. 
  
Krapfel,  R.E., Salmond, D. and Spekman, R. (1991), “A strategic approach to managing 
buyer-seller relationships”, European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 25 No. 9, pp. 22-37. 
 
Kumar, N. (1996), “The power of trust in manufacturer-retailer relationships”, Harvard 
Business Review, November-December, pp. 92-106. 
 
Lele, U. (1981), “Cooperatives and the poor: a comparative perspective”, World 
Development, Vol. 9, pp. 55-72. 
 
Lohtia, R. and Krapfel, R.E. (1994), “The impact of transaction-specific investments on 
buyer-seller relationships”, Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 6-
16. 
 
Lyon, F. (2000), “Trust, networks and norms: the creation of social capital in agricultural 
economies in Ghana”, World Development, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 663-681. 
 
Madhok, A. (1995), “Revisiting multinational firm’s tolerance for joint ventures: A trust-
based approach”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 26 No. 1, pp. 117-137.  
 
Mendoza, G. (1995), “A primer on marketing channels and margins” in Scott, G. J. (ed), 
Prices, Products and People. Analysing Agricultural Markets in Developing Countries, 
Lynne Rienner, Boulder, pp. 257-276. 
 
Mendoza, M.S. and Rosegrant, M.W. (1995), “Pricing conduct of spatially differentiated 
markets”, in Scott, G. J. (ed),  Prices, Products and People. Analysing Agricultural Markets 
in Developing Countries, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, pp. 343-360. 
 
Moorman, C., Deshpande, R. and Zaltman, G. (1993), “Factors affecting trust in market 
research relationships”, Journal of Marketing, Vol, 57 January, pp. 81-101. 
 
Morgan, R.M. and Hunt, S.D. (1994), “The commitment-trust theory of relationship 
marketing”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 58 July, pp. 20-38. 
 
Murphy, J.T. (2002), “Networks, trust and innovation in Tanzania’s manufacturing sector”, 
World Development, Vol. 30 No. 4, pp. 591-619. 
  
Nahapiet, J. and Ghoshal, S. (1998), “Social capital, intellectual capital and the organisational 
advantage”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 242-266. 
 
Oliver, C. (1990), “Determinants of interorganisational relationships: integration and future 
directions”, Academy of Management Review, Vol 15 No. 2, pp. 241-265. 
 
Oliver, R.L. (1980), “A cognitive model of the antecedents and consequences of satisfaction 
decisions”, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 17 November, pp. 460-69. 
 
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R. (1978), The External Control of Organisations: A Resource-
Dependence Perspective. Harper and Row. New York. 
 
Pomeroy, R.S. and Trinidad, A.C, (1995), “Industrial organisation and market analysis: fish 
marketing”, in Scott, G. J. (ed) Prices, Products and People. Analysing Agricultural Markets 
in Developing Countries, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, pp. 217-238. 
 
Putnam, R.D. (1993), “The prosperous community: social capital and public life”, American 
Prospect, Vol. 13, pp. 35-42. 
 
Putnam, R.D. (1995), “Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital”, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 6, pp. 65-78. 
 
Sharp, J.S. and Smith, M.B. (2003), “Social capital and farming at the rural-urban interface: 
the importance of non-farmer and farmer relations”, Agricultural Systems, Vol.6 No. 3, pp 
913-927. 
  
Singh, J. and Sirdeshmukh, D. (2000), “Agency and trust mechanisms in consumer 
satisfaction and loyalty judgements”, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Vol.28 
No. 1, pp. 150-167. 
 
Spreng, R.A., Mackenzie, S.B. and Olshavsky, R.W. (1996), “A re-examination of the 
determinants of consumer satisfaction”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 60 July, pp. 15-32. 
 
Swan, J.E. and Combs, L.J. (1976), “Product performance and customer satisfaction: a new 
concept”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 40, pp. 25-33. 
 
Tagarino, D.D., Cungihan, E.B. and Paday-os, J.B. (1998), Analysis of the Credit Market for 
Potato Production and Marketing in the Cordillera Administrative Region. HARRDEC.  
 
Tikkanen, H. and Alajoutsijarvi, K. (2002), “Customer satisfaction in industrial markets: 
opening up the concept”, Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, Vol 17 No. 1), pp. 
25-42.  
 
Williamson, O.E. (1979), “Transaction cost economics: the governance of contractual 
relations”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22 October, pp. 233-262. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free Press. New 
York. 
 
Wilson, D.T. (1995), “An integrated model of buyer-seller relationships”, Journal of Academy 
of Marketing Science, Vol 23 No. 4, pp. 335-345. 
 
Woodruff, R.B. (1997), “Customer value: the next source for competitive advantage”, Journal 
of the Academy of Marketing Science, Vol. 25 No. 2, pp. 139-153. 
 
Zucker, L.G. (1986), “Production of trust: institutional sources of economic structure, 1840-
1920”, Research in Organisational Behaviour, Vol. 8, pp. 53-111.  
 
 
 
 
